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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of economic and commercial diplomacy on 
the geography of international trade. We replicate a recent study by Rose 
(2007) extending the analysis to include the year 2006 and 63 importing and 
exporting countries. Using a gravity model we are able to demonstrate that 
diplomatic representation via embassies and consulates is not a relevant trade 
enhancing factor for trade within the OECD. In contrast diplomatic 
representation is significant in bilateral trade relationships of developing 
countries as it both facilitates imports and stimulates exports. We discuss some 
implications of our findings for developing countries especially in view of 
South–South trade. 
Keywords 
Gravity model, development, south–south trade, diplomacy 
JEL-classification 
F19, F55, F59, O19, O24 
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THE WEIGHT OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL 
DIPLOMACY1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the first application of the gravity model of international trade by 
Tinbergen (1962), empirical trade analysts have acknowledged the need to take 
political factors into account when they were trying to explain the geography of 
international trade. In a data set that related to 1959, covered about 70% of 
world trade and comprised 42 countries (both developing nations and major 
OECD countries), Tinbergen estimated trade-stimulating preferential 
treatment to yield ‘colonial or ex-colonial’ trade multipliers of about ten, 
indicating that (ex) colonial ties gave rise to ten times the usual trade volume. 
The measurement of political factors in this seminal study admittedly was 
rather crude as it only used a binary variable. Interestingly, Tinbergen himself 
appears to have been a bit puzzled by the actual size of his ‘political’ trade 
multiplier.  
While preferences based on colonial ties from the past have become 
weaker in the course of time (Bikker, 1987, p. 330), significance of political 
factors still is a consistent finding in recent alternative specifications and data 
sets (see Van Bergeijk 2009, especially Table 1.2, p. 6). Importantly, the result 
that political factors are very relevant for the volume and direction of trade 
flows was also found when the measurement of international relations was 
refined beyond the stage of crude dummy variables. Pollins (1989) combined 
political event observations with trade data testing the empirical relevance of 
incorporating a measure of diplomatic relations into a 25-nation gravity model 
of international trade for 16 annual cross-sectional estimations for the years 
1960–1975. Summary (1989) developed a gravity-type model for the United 
States vis-à-vis 66 trading partners showing that international political factors, 
such as arms transfers from NATO countries and the number of foreign 
agents registered in the United States were ‘significant enhancement factors’ in 
export and import equations for the United States in the years 1978 and 1982.  
Recently there has been a surge in the empirical trade literature that makes 
a clearer and more unambiguous link between trade and trade-related political 
(or ‘diplomatic’) activities. The focus is on specific manner of diplomatic 
exchange such as the influence exerted by the full infrastructure of embassies 
and consulates (Rose 2007), changes in this infrastructure (Maurel and Afman 
2010, especially regarding Eastern Europe) and official state visits supported by 
this infrastructure (Nitsch 2007). Embassies and consulates may be of interest 
                                                 
1 Mina Yakop, University of Amsterdam (m.yakop@student.uva.nl; Peter A.G. van 
Bergeijk, International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague: bergeijk@iss.nl 
Preliminary versions were presented at the Conference ‘Why the world is not flat’ 
University of Groningen October 2007 and a Special Research in Progress seminar at 
ISS (May 2009). Comments by Franc Klaassen and participants of both meetings are 
gratefully acknowledged.  
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for two distinct reasons. Firstly, good and stable political relations by building 
on mutual thrust provide the first best instrument to reduce the risk of future 
distortions and trade disruptions (Van Marrewijk and Van Bergeijk 1993). 
Secondly, embassies and consulates help to generate knowledge about (future) 
opportunities for trade and investment and thus may add to the stock of 
knowledge about foreign markets which – if shared with (potential) exporters – 
reduces the costs that have to be incurred for exporting to and investing in 
these markets (on the former aspect see Krautheim 2007). The seminal paper 
in the recent strand of the literature is Rose (2007) who using a gravity model 
for the year 2002 for 22 exporting countries and 200 importing countries 
provides the first empirical multi-country investigation into the question 
whether exports are in fact systematically associated with the number of 
diplomatic representations abroad.  His finding of a significant and 
economically meaningful impact has stimulated a lot of research and these 
follow-up studies consistently find significant and empirically relevant 
indications for trade creation by means of economic diplomacy. Afman and 
Maurel (2010), for example, estimate that the opening of an embassy in an 
emerging market in Eastern Europe is equivalent to an ad valorem tariff 
reduction of 2 to 12 percentage points. 
Most studies have followed the framework of Rose (2007) in particular 
using the same or a comparable trade data set. Although the number of 
destinations that are covered in these studies is large (some 150 to 220 
countries) and coverage thus appears to be sufficient to enable useful 
generalization with respect to destinations, the datasets are rather skewed. On 
the one hand, the 150 to 200 import destinations may imply large cross-
country heterogeneity leading to invalid results and on this account the number 
of importing countries needs reconsideration. On the other hand, the sample 
of countries from which international trade flows originate is rather restricted 
as the available studies have so far focused on the exports of a select group of 
countries, namely the larger OECD countries and the BRIIC countries (Rose 
2007, Segura-Cayela and Vilarrubia 2008, Afman and Maurel 2010). Often the 
focus is even narrower. Gil-Pareja et al. (2007) investigate exports of tourism 
services that originate in the G7 countries. The available econometric studies 
that deal with state visits only cover the US, Germany, France and Canada 
(Head and Ries 2006, Nitsch 2007). Thus these studies offer little guidance on 
the question whether economic and commercial diplomacy can or cannot be of 
use for developing countries. Would the same results still be obtained for a 
wider range of exporting countries? To answer this question many more 
countries would have to be included on the exporter side, especially lower-
income countries.  
The contribution of this article is that it provides this more balanced and 
much broader perspective and thus enables us to focus deeper on the effects 
of economic diplomacy upon trade between different country groups 
according to different income levels. Moreover, this approach provides us with 
a fresh perspective on the potential utility of economic and commercial 
diplomacy in the context of South–South trade, an issue which has not been 
investigated so far. 
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We arrive at this more balanced dataset by increasing (reducing) the 
number of exporting (importing) countries to 63, so that a 63 x 63 trade matrix 
results. The analytical range of the study is extended to include much more low 
and middle income countries. In the discussion of our empirical results we will 
often refer to Rose’s findings as this has become the major reference on this 
topic, but it should be noted that the other studies that we discussed are 
equally vulnerable for a critique on the way their data sets have been 
constructed. Table 1 compares the countries studied by Rose and the countries 
used in the present analysis and Appendix I provides a list of the countries 
concerned. It is important to note that the symmetry of our 63 x 63 country 
matrix (which contrasts to the Rose 22 x 200, the Segura-Cayela and Vilarrubia 
21 x 163, the Gil-Pareja 7 x 156 and the Nitsch 3 x 200 matrices) will allow us 
to asses the import facilitating role of embassies and consulates on the same 
footing as their export promoting function. 
TABLE 1 
Comparison of the sample of Rose (2007) and the sample in this study 
 Rose (2007) This study 
Low-income countries (LIC) 1 5% 8 13% 
Lower-middle income countries (LMIC) 2 9% 14 22% 
Upper-middle income countries (UMIC) 5 23% 14 22% 
High-income countries (HIC) 14 64% 27 43% 
Total 22 100% 63 100% 
 
The remainder of this working paper is organized as follows. Section 1 
provides a discussion on the economic rationale for embassies and consulates 
as a means to provide market access and to reduce market failures. Arguably 
the market failures that can be repaired by means of government intervention 
through economic and diplomatic diplomacy are especially relevant for 
developing countries. Section 2 sets the stage for the empirical analysis. We 
explain our empirical tool (that is the gravity model of international trade), 
argue why this approach is especially apt for the present analysis and discuss 
the construction of our data set. Section 3 presents the general empirical results 
of a cross section analysis of the impact of embassies and consulates on 3730 
bilateral trade flows in the year 2006. We also consider three econometric 
issues that appear important for the interpretation of our results: the issue of 
possible reverse causality between trade and the extent of foreign diplomatic 
representation, the country-pair-wise fixed effects and the impact of 176 zero 
trade flows (i.e. 4.5% of the potential observations). Section 4 then zooms in 
on the question of how the level of economic development interacts with the 
impact of embassies and consulates on trade. We find that the effect within the 
group of higher income countries is not significant. Probably information 
about these markets and their institutions is sufficiently well established so that 
public intervention is not necessary. For the relations between and with 
developing countries the network of embassies and consulates, however, 
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provides a significant and very useful trade enhancing role. The final section 
concludes and discusses the policy relevance of our findings in particular in 
relation to South–South trade. 
2 WHY DOES ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY 
MATTER? 
It is probably fair to say that most ‘Economics 101’ courses introduce the 
welfare gains of international trade by a discussion of comparative advantage 
based on David Ricardo’s example of the trade between Britain (wool) and 
Portugal (wine) and thereby follow the suggestion implicit in his Principles of 
Economics that this pattern of specialization is a direct consequences of the free 
functioning of markets. Ricardo ([1817] 1962, para. 7.1) assesses his theory of 
comparative advantage (that explains the ‘natural trade’ that leads Portugal to 
export wine and England to export cloth) as follows: 
Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its 
capital and labour to such employments as are most beneficial to each. This 
pursuit of individual advantage is admirably connected with the universal good of 
the whole. By stimulating industry, by regarding ingenuity, and by using most 
efficaciously the peculiar powers bestowed by nature, it distributes labour most 
effectively and most economically: while, by increasing the general mass of 
productions, it diffuses general benefit, and binds together by one common tie of 
interest and intercourse, the universal society of nations throughout the civilized 
world. 
The issue, however, that is relevant for our discussion is that trade in wine and 
cloth between Portugal and England had not been the outcome of free trade at 
all. On the contrary, the trade in wine and cloth between Portugal and England 
was the result of commercial and economic diplomacy and had been arranged 
in the context of the Methuen Treaty, a military and commercial treaty between 
Portugal and England signed in 1703 as part of the War of the Spanish 
Succession (Felipe and Vernengo 2002).  This historical context of one of the 
most important tools of trade analysis provides the lesson that comparative 
advantage is only one side of the coin and that economic and commercial 
diplomacy can be important drivers of trading patterns as well. The remainder 
of this subsection addresses the question why this is so. 
In a nutshell, economic diplomacy is the use of international political tools 
(diplomacy) to obtain economic objectives and as such has actually existed ever 
since ancient civilisations have engaged themselves in commerce and trade 
(Coolsaet, 2001). Public officials from overseas missions such as embassies and 
consulates, Foreign Affairs and other government departments (such as 
Economic Affairs, Trade and Commerce) are involved in the promotion of 
foreign direct investment and international trade by supplying information and 
advise about trade and investment opportunities and by organising and helping 
to act as hosts to trade missions from the home country (Saner and Yu 2003 
provide a detailed discussion).  The neo classical argument, however, is that 
firms can be expected to enter foreign markets on their own account and if 
they have to be aided by governments – then, perhaps their products are just 
not good enough. If so the tax payer’s money that ultimately finances 
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commercial policy and economic diplomacy is wasted, just as in the case of a 
traditional export subsidy. Commercial policy and economic diplomacy imply a 
transfer (for example a free service) from the public sector to commercial 
activities while it is a priori unclear if the private benefits exceed the cost of 
providing the public service. Still economic diplomacy and commercial policy 
remain relevant real world phenomena. Is this because the economic recipe is 
wrong, or is this just an other case of economists that are right but are unable 
to get it right?  
At a very practical and concrete level, the public sector’s involvement may 
be necessary for three reasons. First, the type of product may require public 
sector involvement either on the demand side (for example large infrastructural 
works) or on the supply side (military or dual use goods). Second, trading may 
require public sector involvement at the side either of the exporter or of the 
importer, for cultural reasons or because the public sector is dominant and/or 
(former) state enterprises are involved (typically this is relevant for the 
relatively new entrants to the world economic system, i.e. many developing 
countries). Third, high ranking government officials such as ambassadors may 
be needed to signal the importance that a country attaches to the commercial 
relationships that will be discussed thus offering an implicit guarantee that 
these relationships will be free from negative political disturbances. All three 
arguments boil down to the fact that public sector involvement is a necessary 
condition for market access and thus an instrument to reduce or eliminate 
cultural non-tariff barriers to trade and investment.  
A key insight of the recent literature is that, moreover, diplomatic 
representations may provide a superior level and quantity of trade-and-
investment-related knowledge. This insight implies that market failure 
regarding the production of (private) knowledge may provide a further 
economic theoretic argument for economic diplomacy. An exporting firm 
needs a lot of information about foreign markets before it can successfully 
attempt to trade with a firm in another country. Sometimes this information is 
acquired experimentally by trying to enter the country, but often consultants 
and business trips as well as information from export promotion agencies or 
colleagues will be tapped.  The relevant topics about which firms typically need 
information include: local consumer preferences and their ability to adapt to 
new products c.q. the need to adapt products and their marketing to local needs 
(including language, technical and meteorological, religious and cultural 
aspects); the reliability of local trading partners, that is the opportunities to 
establish long-term relationships which may include customs as well as laws 
and legal procedures; the distribution networks that exist or can be developed 
(which typically also involve the availability of modern communication 
networks, harbour facilities and so on); quality standards and legal, 
environmental and institutional requirements; prospects for markets, in 
particular the niches and products where profit opportunities exist; and the 
local negotiating and contracting procedures as well as the extent to which 
contracts are actually enforced. As a general rule, the necessary information 
requires substantial investment (even when acquired on a trial and error basis) 
and will be imperfect in nature. Often such manner of information has an 
asymmetric character; because the firms in the importing country have a 
substantial advantage in both acquiring and developing such country-specific 
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knowledge and in assessing the reliability of such information. Typically, this 
manner of knowledge is built in networks of foreign firms (because proximity 
and existing business and personal networks are often a pre-condition), but 
such networks may also act as a barrier to entrée. Moreover, investing in better 
knowledge does not take place in the private sector because of externalities 
(such as demonstration effects that can be followed suit by competitors), free 
rider problems or due to the public good character of certain manner of 
information, which according to Harris and Li (2005, p. 74) include:  
unique, reliable and impartial access to information, such as through the global 
embassy network and other government channels and contacts, which become 
available through the government’s very long-term, and non-commercial 
attachment to overseas markets. 
The relevant rationale for government intervention, that is an active role in the 
generation of knowledge or the allocation of subsidies to investments in such 
knowledge, rests on the fact that the production of knowledge about foreign 
markets will be sub-optimal and that access to such knowledge in some cases 
actually requires involvement of government officials. Indeed, if such learning 
externalities do exist then the market does not supply the optimal investment 
of firms in international activities basically because expropriability problems 
exist.  
Governments, moreover, may have other roles to play when market 
failures occur (see Alexander and Warwick, 2007), for example, in signalling 
the quality of its exporters. Generally speaking the authorities can clarify that 
their firms have to meet high standards in terms of product quality, 
environmental standards, corporate responsibility and, moreover, they may be 
able to communicate that their economy is a reliable partner in international 
trade. Such promotional information may be seen as an investment in the 
exporting nation’s trademark or ‘trade capital’ and as such has a public good 
character.  
The mere existence of a market failure and the possibility that public 
intervention may fix that problem, however, constitutes a necessary but never a 
sufficient condition, as noted by Hoekman and Smarzynska-Javoricik (2004, p. 
3):  
Pro-active support policies of whatever stripe should be subject to cost-benefit 
analysis and be informed by answers to the following types of questions: where is 
the market failure? What is the objective of a policy? How is the performance 
and cost effectiveness going to be monitored? It should also be recognized that 
such interventions are frequently associated with the risk of misdiagnosing the 
problem and the possibility of capture by rent seekers. 
The government intervention should thus generate more benefits to society 
than it costs (including the distortions introduced by taxation). Obviously such 
a cost-benefit analysis would go beyond the scope of this paper given the large 
number of countries involved. But we do provide important basic information 
for cost-benefit analyses by testing empirically whether embassies and 
consulates promote trade. It is important to estimate the impact of economic 
diplomacy empirically, because rejection of the hypothesized positive impact of 
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embassies and consulates would imply a negative outcome for a cost-benefit 
analysis. We now turn to this important empirical question. 
3 EMPIRICAL DESIGN: THE GRAVITY APPROACH 
A lot of models have been used to describe international trade flows. Models 
do not only differ with respect to the degree of detail, but also with respect to 
the specific theoretical interest of the investigator. For the present study we use 
a relatively simple empirical model. Tinbergen (1962, pp. 262–93) developed 
the gravity model and Linnemann (1966) is the traditional reference on the 
early gravity model.  The gravity model has become the empirical workhorse 
for many investigations in economic trade and has a rich history in the regional 
economics literature. In the basic model three explanatory variables appear: (i) 
the exporting country’s Gross Domestic Product Yi, (ii) the importing 
country’s GDP Yj and (iii) the distance Dij between the two countries. The 
basic model is known in international trade theory as the gravity equation, 
because of its similarity to the Newtonian law of gravity: the bilateral trade 
flow is assumed to be a function of the economic masses of the two trade 
partners and the inverted distance between the two countries. The intuition 
behind this formula is appealing. First, the supply of goods depends positively 
on the exporting country’s economic size and production capacity which is 
represented by its GDP. Second, the demand for these exports depends 
positively on the importing country’s market which is also represented by its 
GDP. Third, transportation costs, transportation time and the ‘economic 
horizon’ of the exporter (all assumed to correspond roughly with the 
geographic distance between the exporting and importing country) have a 
negative impact on trade. Formulated in this intuitive way the gravity equation 
appears to be the reduced form solution to a not explicitly formulated supply 
and demand system. Hence we have the following equation for the gravity 
model in its simplest form. 
Eij = Yiα Yjβ Dij γ (1) 
Here α > 0, β> 0 and γ < 0, while Eij are the exports from country i to country 
j, Usually the populations Ni and Nj of the trade partners are added to this 
equation as are a number of other (often binary or dummy) variables that 
represent trade enhancing and trade resistance factors that are typically relevant 
in bilateral exchanges. Examples of such factors comprise, among others, a 
common border, a common language, a common currency, or an (ex) colonial 
relationship, but also individual country characteristics are added such as the 
area of the economy or the fact that it is an island economy. 
The gravity model which has been widely used in policy institutions since 
the 1960s can be derived on the basis of economic theory. Bergstrand was the 
first to relate the gravity equation to its microeconomic foundations 
(Bergstrand 1985) and to give a formal derivation of the gravity equation 
within the context of a general equilibrium model of world trade with 
imperfect competition and product differentiation (Bergstrand 1989). 
Deardorff (1995), Feenstra et al. (2001) and Evenett and Keller (2002) are 
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examples of contributions to the gravity literature that showed that the model 
can be derived from Heckscher-Ohlin, increasing returns to scale, Ricardian 
models, and so on. Interest in the gravity equation and its ability to track non-
economic factors was also stimulated by the influential article by Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003). Policy barriers, information and enforcement costs and 
diverging rules and legal frameworks were shown to exercise the same impact 
as an ad valorem tariff equivalent of 44% (that is twice the impact of 
transportation costs). Indeed, it is this cost component that definitely produces 
negative externalities and therefore it should be the target for policy makers 
that want to minimize the cost of distance. Empirical research, moreover, 
uncovered distance’s truly multidimensional (economic, cultural, political and 
so on) nature (see Linders et al. 2004 for a review of the literature) and also 
these new dimensions proved to be very stimulating.  
In assessing the potential utility of the gravity approach for the present 
empirical investigation one has to consider both the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the method. On the one hand, the critics of the model are right 
in many respects. For example, the analysis is essentially of a comparative static 
nature. Only one equation is used to explain the value of total exports to 
another country. So basically we have a turnover relation in which prices are 
not specified. Moreover, substitution between trade flows is absent (that is the 
issue of trade diversion is not really covered; see Bikker, 2010). On the other 
hand the model’s simplicity constitutes its strength, because the model deploys 
only a limited number of variables and this facilitates computation, keeps the 
data problems manageable and the results better traceable. Noteworthy is the 
gravity equation’s ability to incorporate ‘empirical regularities’ such as intra-
industry trade, the impact of transport costs and the influence of differences in 
per capita income on trade flows. More important, however, is the observation 
that the problem that is to be addressed in this paper concerns the question of 
increased explanation when we include certain instruments of economic and 
commercial diplomacy in a traditional trade model. As this investigation deals 
with the actual impact of economic and commercial diplomacy on the level 
and pattern of bilateral trade flows, the choice of the gravity model is almost 
unavoidable because the gravity model provides an empirical explanation for 
the geography and level of bilateral trade flows. In addition, robustness and 
general acceptance of the method are essential for our analysis. Therefore it is 
relevant that the gravity model presently is accepted both in academic and in 
policy circles. 
In our research we will follow Rose’s research design as closely as possible 
so as to provide a useful basis for comparison. In particular we will use his 
reduced form gravity equation and where possible we use the same sources for 
the explanatory variables. The equation to be estimated is 
ln(Xij) = β0 + β1lnDij + β2ln(Yi) + β3ln(Yj) + β4ln(Popi) + β5ln(Popj) 
+ β6Langij + β7Contij +   β7Landlij + β8Islandij +β9ln(Areai*Areaj) + 
β10Colij + β11CUij + β12FTAij +  γEmbConij + εij 
(2) 
where i denotes the exporter, j denotes the importer, and the relevant variables 
are as follows:  
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 Xij is merchandise exports in dollars for the year 2006, from i to j; 
 EmbConij is the number of embassies and consulates (i.e. official foreign 
missions) that i has in j; 
 Dij is the distance between i and j; 
 Yk is GDP per capita in dollars in 2006, for k = {i, j}; 
 Popk is average population (in millions of people in 2006), for k = {i, j}; 
 Areak is the area of the country (in square kilometres) for k = {i, j}; 
 
and the following dummy variables:  
 
 Langij is 1 if i and j have a common language, 0 otherwise; 
 Contij is 1 if i and j share a land border, 0 otherwise; 
 Colij is 1 if i and j are colonies or shared a colonial relationship, 0 
otherwise; 
 CUij is 1 if i and j use the same currency, 0 otherwise; 
 FTAij is 1 if i and j belong to the same regional trade agreement, 0 
otherwise; 
 Landlij is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair: 0 if both 
i and j are not landlocked, 1 if either i or j is landlocked, and 2 if both i and 
j are landlocked;  
 
and εij is the error term.   
 
Since we estimate this equation for a more recent year 2006 (the study by Rose 
refers to 2002), the process of updating generates small differences which we 
discuss below.  Note that we will to some extent take care of this issue (that 
may distort comparison with other studies in the field) by replicating Rose’s 
research for a matrix of his 22 exporters x our 63 import destinations. 
Data on bilateral trade flows in millions of US dollars at free-on-board 
prices were collected from the International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade 
Statistics for the year 2006. GDP per capita data and population figures (millions 
of people) were obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 
2007. Data on distance, area, common language, common border, colonial 
relationship, and landlockedness, were collected online from CEPII (Centre 
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales) which provides area 
of countries in km2 and the geodesic distances between countries using the 
great circle formula. The colonial binary dummy variable chosen for the 
current analysis specifies whether two countries ever had a colonial link 
throughout history. We constructed the two binary dummy variables for 
whether countries are in the same currency union (CU), and are in the same 
regional trade agreement (RTA) manually by inspecting the WTO website on 
all RTA’s and CU’s ratified until 2006. The data set for the number of 
embassies and consulates has been constructed on the basis of the websites of 
the 63 ministries of Foreign Affairs concerned. Here our data differ from 
Rose’s data with respect to the year of observation, and because we do count 
embassies and consulates irrespective of their location in a country and because 
we do not count so-called permanent representations because the diplomats of 
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such embassies work in international organizations (such as UN, ILO or 
NATO) and are not involved in bilateral trade and investment. Anyhow these 
differences are small. 
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the regression analyses. Table 2 starts with 
Rose’s (2007) results in column 1 for a sample of 22 exporting countries and 
200 importing countries in the year 2002. Next we provide for the year 2006 as 
close a replication as possible starting with a sample that consists of the same 
22 exporting countries and our sub-sample of 63 importing countries (column 
2). Column 3 reports the findings for our full sample of 63 exporting and 63 
importing countries. Before we move to the variable of interest, ‘the number of 
foreign missions’, we take a closer look at the general performance and the 
other variables of the gravity model.  Comparing columns 1 and 2 we note that 
the results obtained are close to those of Rose with equal signs of the estimated 
coefficients, and a comparable explanatory power. Roughly half of the 
coefficients estimated is about the same although we obtain estimates that are 
smaller in absolute terms for the coefficients RTA, CU, common language, 
land border, landlocked, and especially the island and the (ex)colonial dummy 
variables that become insignificant in our estimates. All in all we are able to 
replicate Rose’s findings to a large extent. This is an important indication that 
differences between our full sample findings and those of Rose are probably 
not due to the fact that we study a different year or have a smaller sample of 
importing countries. Rather these differences would seem to occur because we 
study a larger (and symmetric) group of exporting countries. 
We can now take a look at how the enlargement of the data set influences 
the estimates as shown for the full sample 63 x 63 (column 3). Typically the 
absolute values of the coefficients for the core model (distance, per capita GDP 
and population) are comparable or larger whereas the coefficients for the 
dummy variables have a mixed record. Some coefficients converge to the 
estimates of Rose (2007) such as the common land border dummy and the 
currency union dummy which is now both significant and negative. 
Incidentally, we think that the latter result does not so much reflect the impact 
from currency unions as well as the fact that the major currency union (EMU) 
relates to OECD countries only and may thus be picking up the differences 
between developing en developed countries that we will discuss in section 5. 
Other coefficients increase such as product area and a common language 
illustrating how information on a broader data set reflects in the estimated 
coefficients. In view of the changes the estimated coefficient economic and 
commercial diplomacy appears to be rather stable. 
The coefficient of interest is the number of embassies and consulates. The 
coefficient estimates are positive and significant ranging from 0.06 to 0.09. 
Therefore based on a different sample of countries and sample year, we can 
agree with Rose (2007) when he argues that embassies and consulates are 
systematically linked with increasing exports. This is a relevant finding because 
Rose’s conclusion was limited to a much smaller sample of mainly high income 
exporting countries. We will show in section 5 that Rose’s conclusion needs  
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TABLE 2 
Empirical results of the OLS estimation of the gravity equation) 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Full sample Sample Rose 
22 x 200 
Replication 
22 x 63 63 x 63 63 x 63 63 x 63 
Year of observation 2002 2006 2006 2006 2006 
N 4123 1356 3730 3730 3730 
Number of foreign missions† 
(export promoting) 
0.10*** 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
Number of foreign missions, j 
in i   
(import facilitating) 
   
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Log distance -0.69*** 
(0.04) 
-0.79*** 
(0.04) 
-0.74*** 
(0.04) 
-0.75*** 
(0.04) 
-0.74*** 
(0.04) 
Log exporter GDP p/c 0.86*** 
(0.03) 
0.86*** 
(0.04) 
1.23*** 
(0.02) 
1.22*** 
(0.02) 
1.21*** 
(0.02) 
Log importer GDP p/c 0.83*** 
(0.02) 
0.89*** 
(0.02) 
0.99*** 
(0.02) 
1.01*** 
(0.02) 
1.99*** 
(0.02) 
Log exporter population 0.96*** 
(0.03) 
0.98*** 
(0.03) 
1.28*** 
(0.03) 
1.28*** 
(0.03) 
1.27*** 
(0.03) 
Log importer population 1.01*** 
(0.02) 
1.00*** 
(0.02) 
1.18*** 
(0.03) 
1.21*** 
(0.03) 
1.17*** 
(0.03) 
Regional Trade Agreement † 
(dummy) 
0.86*** 
(0.08) 
0.29*** 
(0.07) 
0.37*** 
(0.06) 
0.38*** 
(0.06) 
0.37*** 
(0.06) 
Currency union † 
(dummy) 
-0.27 
(0.18) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
-0.34* 
(0.18) 
-0.33* 
(0.18) 
-0.35** 
(0.18) 
Log product area -0.15*** 
(0.01) 
-0.14*** 
(0.02) 
-0.20*** 
(0.02) 
-0.19*** 
(0.02) 
-0.20*** 
(0.02) 
Common language 
(dummy) 
0.57*** 
(0.07) 
0.34*** 
(0.10) 
0.71*** 
(0.10) 
0.72*** 
(0.10) 
0.69*** 
(0.10) 
Land Border 
(dummy) 
1.06*** 
(0.16) 
0.37** 
(0.16) 
0.90*** 
(0.17) 
0.95*** 
(0.17) 
0.86*** 
(0.17) 
Landlocked (dummy) -0.75*** 
(0.05) 
-0.31*** 
(0.09) 
-0.23*** 
(0.08) 
-0.23*** 
(0.08) 
-0.22*** 
(0.08) 
Islands (dummy) -0.27*** 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
Colony (dummy) 3.25*** 
(0.38) 
0.14 
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
0.07 
(0.18) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
R² 0.77 0.77 0.67 0.67 0.67 
***, **, * implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. 
† Empirical implementation of the variable is slightly different from Rose (2007) 
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  
Included in the regression but not reported is the constant. 
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further qualification since the effect seems to be driven to a large extent by the 
trade flows that originate or end in low and middle income countries. 
The symmetric nature of our data matrices allows us to investigate 
import facilitation in addition to and in combination with the export 
facilitation that we have studied until now. The measurement of import 
facilitation is simply the inverse of export facilitation. Many of the functions of 
embassies and consulates such as providing information, building thrust or 
public involvement matter as much for imports as for exports. Indeed 
attracting business and imports towards the domestic economy is an essential 
function of economic diplomacy. Thus the exports of goods from, for 
example, Egypt to the Netherlands may be stimulated by both the export 
facilitating role of the Egyptian embassy in the Hague and the import 
facilitating role of the Netherlands embassy in Cairo. This is, however, an 
empirical question: if import facilitation turns out to be insignificant, then 
outward economic diplomacy is more effective in fighting market failures than 
inward economic diplomacy.  
Two additional regressions provide information. Column 4 in Table 2 
replaces the independent variable ‘number of foreign missions’ with the import 
facilitating representation ‘number of foreign missions, j in i' and reports a 
significant effect of import facilitation. An extra mission of the exporting 
county in the importing country leads to 5% more imports for the importing 
country if we do not take into account of the export facilitating effect. Column 
5 in Table 2, however,  takes simultaneously the presence of the exporting 
countries in the importing countries (i in j) and also the presence of the 
importing countries in the exporting countries (j in i) into account. In this 
specification the import facilitating embassies and consulates are insignificant. 
Export facilitating representations are still significant increasing exports once 
more by 9%. This suggests that diplomatic representations do not focus on 
attracting business towards the domestic home markets as much as they 
support businesses abroad.  
Thus, import facilitation is not as significant a task in influencing trade. 
We will check this finding in a subsection when we introduce fixed effects. 
Indeed, before we can continue with a more detailed discussion of how the 
level of economic development interacts with the impact of embassies and 
consulates on trade, we will first have to address three econometric issues 
(endogeneity, fixed effects and zero trade flows) in order to check whether the 
present research design can cope with these issues that are general nuisances of 
applied gravity models. 
4.1 Endogeneity: reverse causality 
So far we have assumed that an effect exists which foreign missions exert on 
trade, but it is not unreasonable to assume that it is also possible that 
diplomatic missions will be set up in countries with which one has already 
strong economic and/or political relationships. If this is the case then 
endogeneity of the number of foreign missions is of econometric concern 
because the problem of reverse causality leads to biased and inconsistent 
estimates. We address this issue by introducing instrumental variables that  
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TABLE 3 
Instrumental variables 
correlate with the number of foreign missions each exporter has in each 
importing country and yet are uncorrelated with the error term of bilateral 
trade between these two countries. Following Rose (2007) we collect two 
groups of instrumental variables that either measure the geo-political weight a 
country, such as the amount of proven gas reserves (in cubic metres) or the 
amount of proven oil reserves (in billions of barrels), or measure the quality of 
living and attractiveness as the desirability of residing in a particular country 
may be an incentive for diplomats to set up missions (such as the number of 
Economist city guides, the number of Lonely planet guides and the climate, 
that is whether the country experiences monsoonal rains). An auxiliary 
regression of the number of embassies and consulates on these instrumental 
 (1) 
TSLS 
63 x 63 
(2) 
GMM 
63 x 63 
(3) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (OLS) 
63 x 63 
Number of foreign 
missions, i in j 
0.16** 
(0.06) 
0.16** 
(0.06) 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
Log distance -0.73*** 
(0.04) 
-0.72*** 
(0.04) 
-0.75*** 
(0.04) 
Log exporter GDP p/c 1.21*** 
(0.03) 
1.21*** 
(0.03) 
1.23*** 
(0.02) 
Log importer GDP p/c 0.97*** 
(0.03) 
0.98*** 
(0.04) 
0.98*** 
(0.03) 
Log exporter 
population 
1.27*** 
(0.03) 
1.26*** 
(0.03) 
1.28*** 
(0.03) 
Log importer 
population 
1.14*** 
(0.04) 
1.14*** 
(0.04) 
1.16*** 
(0.03) 
Dummy Regional 
Trade Agreement 
0.37*** 
(0.06) 
0.35*** 
(0.07) 
0.39*** 
(0.06) 
Dummy Currency 
union 
-0.35** 
(0.18) 
-0.33*** 
(0.11) 
-0.34* 
(0.18) 
Log product area -0.20*** 
(0.02) 
-0.20*** 
(0.02) 
-0.20*** 
(0.02) 
Dummy Common 
language 
0.68*** 
(0.10) 
0.68*** 
(0.09) 
0.70*** 
(0.10) 
Dummy Land Border 0.81*** 
(0.19) 
0.82*** 
(0.16) 
0.91*** 
(0.17) 
Dummy Landlocked  -0.22*** 
(0.08) 
-0.21*** 
(0.07) 
-0.23*** 
(0.08) 
Dummy Islands -0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
Colony 0.01 
(0.18) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(0.18) 
ResidIV   -0.04 
(0.05) 
    
N 3730 3730 3730 
R² 0.67 0.67 0.67 
***, **, * implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses. Included but not reported is the constant. 
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variables has an R2 of 0.24 indicating that the instrumental variables chosen are 
not exactly of great quality but could suffice especially since te first-stage F 
statistic is significant at the 99% which gives hardly any concern about weak 
instruments. 
The results of the Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation are summarized 
in Table 3. The first column uses Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) whereas the 
second used Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM). Like Rose (2007) we 
find that IV using either TSLS or GMM do not invalidate the results obtained 
in the previous sections. Moreover, the measured effect of foreign missions 
upon exports is even higher with IV estimation than with OLS (although 
slightly less significant): 0.16 whereas 0.09 was obtained earlier (see Table 2, 
column 3). Note that the measurement of this coefficient is less precise in 
Table 3 as the standard error of the coefficient estimate is three times larger 
than the 0.02 reported in Table 2 so that the level of significance drops from 
99% to 95% (which is still sufficient of course). Column 3 of Table 3 in 
addition reports the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity, where we 
regress the number of foreign missions on the five instrumental variables and 
then include the residuals of this auxiliary regression (ResidIV) as a new 
variable in the initial gravity equation. The confidence level of ResidIV is 56% 
only so that the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, 
also on the basis of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test we can safely conclude that 
the number of foreign missions is exogenous and that our estimates do not 
appear to suffer from reverse causality. 
4.2 Fixed effects 
Standard cross-section estimates of the gravity model may provide biased 
estimates because of omitted variable bias. For one reason, as Cheng and Wall 
(2005) point out, “cultural, historical and political factors are often difficult to 
observe, let alone quantify” Therefore they argue that estimates of the gravity 
model, no matter which new variables are introduced, will always be biased and 
that any regression analysis will suffer from heterogeneity bias. Cheng and Wall 
(2005) provide a straight forward solution. They add simple fixed-effects (FE) 
to the model which represent “fixed pair-specific factors that may be 
correlated with levels of bilateral trade and with the right-hand-side variables” 
(Cheng and Wall 2005). In the case of a cross-section as in the present paper, 
fixed-effects can be introduced by sets of binary dummy variables: one for the 
exporter and one for the importer. 
Table 4 presents results of Fixed Effects (FE) for all combinations of export 
facilitation, import facilitation and exporter FE and importer FE. For the sake 
of comparison OLS coefficients are reported in the column 1.  Three forms of 
FE are used: one using only exporter FE (column 2), one using only importer 
FE (column 3) and in the penultimate column using FE for both the exporter 
and the importer simultaneously. For the equations that investigate the export 
promoting aspect of embassies and consulates the coefficient estimates are in 
the range of 0.06 to 0.10 and are consistently significant at a 99% confidence 
level. The reported estimates for import facilitating representations range 
between an insignificant 0.03 (in the cases of simple OLS and Exporter FE) to 
0.06 in the other cases (significant at a 95% confidence level and better). These 
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findings imply that controlling for unobserved factors is important if we want 
to explain export facilitation and/or import facilitation. Note that the 
coefficient reported in column 5, Table 2 suggested import facilitation to be of 
insignificant impact once we controlled for the export promoting role of on 
embassies and consulates. The findings in Table 4 provide a somewhat 
different view. Although the effect of export promoting representations in 
general continues to be stronger than the effect of import facilitating, we find 
that import facilitation matters once we take account of importer fixed effects. 
TABLE 4 
Coefficient estimates number of foreign missions with fixed effects (FE) 
 
Model OLS 
 
(1) 
Exporter FE 
 
(2) 
Importer FE 
 
(3) 
Exporter and 
importer FE 
(4) 
1 Export Promoting 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
2 Import Facilitating 0.05** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05** 
3 Export promoting 
and Import facilitating 
0.09*** 
0.03***
0.09*** 
0.03 
0.05** 
0.04** 
0.05** 
0.05** 
***, **, * implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively.  
Included but not recorded are the explanatory variables of the gravity model as 
reported in Table 2. 
 
4.3 Zero trade flows 
Out of a potential of 3906 bilateral trade flows we have 176 cases (4.5%) in 
which no trade flow is recorded. For practical estimation purposes zero-flow 
observations were left out. The most obvious practical problem is that ln(0) is 
not defined. Note, moreover, that a zero trade flow according to equation (1) 
would seem to require that at least one of the explanatory variables is zero. The 
gravity model predicts zero flows only when at least one explanatory variable is 
zero and for the explanatory variables in the present model this is unlikely to 
be the case. Hence for (approximately) zero trade flows, the model may not 
give an appropriate description of the relationship between trade flows and its 
explanatory variables. Trade data sources, however, generally do only report 
annual bilateral trade flows that exceed some threshold. Consequently, 
relatively small transactions may occur when the data source reports a 
(rounded off) zero. The combination of actual trade and officially reported 
zero flows may also occur in the case of smuggling or politically sensitive 
goods such as military procurements. So the trade registration system 
obviously generates zero or near-zero flows that do not require one of the 
explanatory variables to be zero. Typically in other investigations zero trade 
flows are a much more substantial nuisance (Rose has 277 cases or 6.3%, but 
even in his study the problem of zero trade flows is not really as important as 
in most applications of the gravity model, see van Bergeijk and Brakman, 
2010). The relevant question is: does the existence of zero flows matter for our 
results. First we take a look at the characteristics of these trade flows. 
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TABLE 5 
Zero trade flows 
 
In our sample zero exports occur rather frequently for Sudan (23), Vietnam 
(22), Algeria (16) and Uganda (16) Of the 176 zero trade flows some 87 
(49.4%) are zero in both directions (that is bilateral exports and imports 
between country A and country B are zero) This group mainly consist of small 
countries that are located in different continents. Vietnam has the largest share 
in these bi-directional zero trade flows (16 flows or 18.3%). In the other 89 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Substituted value  0.5 500 5000 
N 3730 3906 3906 3906 
Number of foreign missions† 
(export promoting) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.12*** 
(0.02) 
Log distance -0.74*** 
(0.04) 
-0.88*** 
(0.04) 
-0.79*** 
((0.05) 
-0.75*** 
(0.04) 
Log exporter GDP p/c 1.23*** 
(0.02) 
1.66*** 
(0.04) 
1.42*** 
(0.03) 
1.31*** 
(0.03) 
Log importer GDP p/c 0.99*** 
(0.02) 
1.36*** 
(0.05) 
1.15*** 
(0.03) 
1.07*** 
(0.03) 
Log exporter population 1.28*** 
(0.03) 
1.53*** 
(0.05) 
1.38*** 
(0.04) 
1.32*** 
(0.03) 
Log importer population 1.18*** 
(0.03) 
1.43*** 
(0.06) 
1.28*** 
(0.04) 
1.21*** 
(0.03) 
Regional Trade Agreement  
(dummy) 
0.37*** 
(0.06) 
0.19* 
(0.12) 
0.25*** 
(0.08) 
0.27*** 
(0.07) 
Currency union  
(dummy) 
-0.34* 
(0.18) 
-0.79** 
(0.34) 
-048** 
(0.23) 
-0.36*** 
(0.19) 
Log product area -0.20*** 
(0.02) 
-0.20*** 
(0.03) 
-0.20*** 
((0.02) 
-0.19*** 
(0.02) 
Common language 
(dummy) 
0.71*** 
(0.10) 
0.97*** 
(0.19) 
0.82*** 
(0.12) 
0.75*** 
(0.11) 
Land Border 
(dummy) 
0.90*** 
(0.17) 
0.93*** 
(0.33) 
0.93*** 
(0.22) 
0.92*** 
(0.18) 
Landlocked (dummy) -0.23*** 
(0.08) 
-0.19 
(0.15) 
-0.15 
(0.10) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
Islands (dummy) -0.07 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.32) 
-0.00 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
Colony (dummy) 0.04 
(0.18) 
0.32 
(0.35) 
-0.13 
(0.23) 
-0.07 
(0.20) 
R² 0.67 0.49 0.62 0.67 
***, **, * implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively. 
† Empirical implementation of the variable is slightly different from Rose (2007) 
Standard errors reported in parentheses.  
Included in the regression but not reported is the constant. 
 21
cases one flow (e.g. export) is zero, but the other flow (e.g. import) is strictly 
positive. There is no obvious pattern and one-sided zero flows occur in all 
continents and at levels of development although more often in the trade 
relations with lower and middle income countries that are located in different 
continents. In order to check whether this problem influences our results we 
perform a linear transformation of the dependent variable and add a small 
constant v to all export data so that the zero observations become strictly 
positive and then re-estimated the equations. Table 5 summarizes the results. 
Column (1) repeats for convenience the preferred equation (Table 2, column 
3). The other three columns show the results for different values of v since the 
choice of the constant is rather arbitrary and can influence the results. 
Typically, however, the key result for the impact of embassies and consulates 
remains valid and appears to be even a bit stronger. 
All in all our preferred equation survives a battery of econometric tests. 
We therefore conclude that it provides a useful tool to further investigate the 
relevance of our findings for countries at different levels of development. 
5 ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL 
DIPLOMACY 
A number of factors suggest that the role of economic and commercial 
diplomacy is probably more important for the international economic relations 
of developing countries. First, asymmetries in the distribution of knowledge 
across countries are largest between the developed and the developing 
countries so that we would expect that public knowledge generation is 
especially relevant in the North–South and South–North relations. Second, 
trade-related institutions are less well developed outside the OECD and this is 
a reason to expect that the government has a larger role to play in trade 
relations that emerge or finish in the developing world. Third and related, 
transparent and easy accessible market information is available to a much larger 
extent for the developed countries so that we expect that economic and 
commercial diplomacy are less relevant determinants of their mutual trade. 
Indeed Piermonti and The (2005, p. 37) are right when they point out that 
search costs will tend to be higher between countries with different business 
practices, and where competitiveness and reliability are not well known to one 
another. Fourth, the role of embassies and consulates may be of particular 
relevance in the starting up phase of international trade and investment 
relationships (see, for example Afman and Maurel 2010) and on this account it 
may have a particularly high value added in trade between emerging markets. 
The assumption that embassies and consulates exert a stronger impact on trade 
for countries at lower levels of development is born out by the data.  
Figure 1 is based on 63 regressions for individual countries (so we 
estimate an export equation for each of the countries in our dataset) and relates 
the estimated coefficient for the number of embassies and consulates to the 
observed per capita GDP of the exporting country. The figure illustrates a 
significantly negative correlation between on the one hand, the estimated 
coefficient for embassies and consulates and on the other hand, GDP per capita. 
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Figure 1 relates to total trade and although suggestive does not inform us in 
which bilateral trade relations embassies and consulates matter and to what 
extent. In order to answer that question we will have to create sub-samples that 
consist of bilateral trade flows between countries that are grouped according to 
their per capita GDP.  
FIGURE 1 
 Estimated coefficient for embassies and consulates versus ln per capita 
GDP (63 individual country specific export regressions, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The regression line is: Estimated coefficient = –0.04 ln GDP per capita + 0.67 
                                                                                      (-2.1)                                (3.7) 
The regression excludes Uganda and Kuwait as their estimated coefficients are insignificant and 
because these countries are the largest positive and negative outliers. Coefficients are significant at the 
95% confidence level and better. 
 
Figure 2 provides a first impression of the more detailed results that pertain to 
the sub-sample analyses. Theoretically we could conceive of four different 
income levels (the well-known analytical country classification of the IMF and 
World Bank): low-income countries (LIC), lower-middle income countries 
(LMIC), upper-middle income countries (UMIC) and finally high-income 
countries (HIC). With four categories 16 sub-regressions (4 x 4) are run that  
analyse the trade between the different country groupings. It is not only 
important that we find a number of significant sub-segments, but also that we 
find insignificant, very small and even negative coefficients for the mutual 
trade of HIC and UMIC. The latter finding is the more relevant since the 
number of bilateral trade flows is relatively large for HIC and UMIC. 
In contrast, many of the sub-samples each contain only a small number 
of bilateral trade flows (for N countries we have N(N–1) bilateral trade flows). 
For example, the LIC sub-sample contains 8 countries. Thus the sub-sample 
regression that deals with LIC–LIC trade would only cover 56 potential  
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FIGURE 2 
 Estimates of the coefficient for embassies and consulates for 16 sub-
segments identified by per capita GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Coefficients in grey are significant at the 99% confidence level (but for LMIC to HIC trade at the 
90% level only) 
 
bilateral trade flows. Likewise the set of potential bilateral trade relations 
between the LIC and LMIC countries contains 112 observations. Clearly, these 
numbers of observations are not enough to obtain robust efficient estimates 
when applying regression analysis with approximately 15 explanatory variables 
as in the present study. Estimating the 16 different coefficients according to 
the 16 different sub-samples provided standard errors that were indeed, 
relatively speaking, quite large. (Note though that the finding of a negative, but 
insignificant coefficient for HIC–HIC trade with 702 potential bilateral 
tradeflows is highly informative as it refutes the hypothesis that embassies and 
consulates are important determinants for these trade flows.)  Due to the small 
amount of observations in many cross sub-sample trade flows, it makes sense 
to combine on the one hand, the sub-samples LIC and LMIC (8 + 14 = 22 
countries) so that we have one group of lower income countries and on the 
other hand, UMIC and HIC (14 + 27 = 41 countries) so as to have one group 
of higher income countries. Thus four separate regressions can be run based 
on larger sub-samples which provide more robust estimates. In particular we 
will estimate gravity equations that include both export facilitation and import 
facilitation (thus comparable to Table 2 column 5). The results of these four 
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regressions are found in Table 6 which shows that export facilitation is 
significant at the 99% level for trade between developing and developed 
countries (and in both directions) and also within the group of lower income 
countries (LIC and LMIC). In contrast within the group of higher income 
countries (UMIC and HIC) the coefficient for embassies and consulates is not 
significant. For import facilitation we find smaller coefficients that are often 
less significant, much in line with the findings reported in Table 2. 
TABLE 6 
Impact export and import facilitation for trade between different income 
country groupingss (β-coefficients) 
 
Our findings thus suggest that economic diplomacy (or more specifically, 
export facilitation by diplomats) does not matter within the group of higher 
income countries, but definitely could be important for lower income 
countries. 
6   DISCUSSION AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
Our replication of the seminal study by Rose (2007) with a larger sample of 
exporting countries and for a more recent year supports his finding that 
embassies and consulates facilitate trade. Positive significant estimates have 
consistently been obtained for the number of embassies and consulates in 
various specifications ranging from 0.06 to 0.16 for export facilitation. For 
trade by and with developing countries even larger elasticities were estimated. 
Moreover, we find that the trade facilitating effects go beyond exports as 
import facilitation has a significant and positive impact on bilateral trade when 
we incorporate fixed effects (although the impact of import facilitation is less 
than of export facilitation).  
One finding of particular relevance is that economic and commercial 
diplomacy is probably more meaningful when it concerns establishing presence 
in developing countries rather than in developed countries. Within the separate 
group of developed countries, economic diplomacy or export facilitation is 
statistically not significant. Economic diplomacy amongst developing countries 
adds value as it facilitates higher trade volumes (and to a lesser but still 
significant extent between developing to developed and vice versa). The 
sensitivity analysis in Rose (2007, Table 2, p. 31) actually foreshadows some of 
   (To) Importing countries 
   LIC + LMIC UMIC + HIC 
LIC + LMIC 
Export facilitation 
Import facilitation 
0.12*** 
0.04 
0.11*** 
0.08* (From) 
Exporting 
countries UMIC +  HIC 
Export facilitation 
Import facilitation 
0.10*** 
0.10*** 
0.02 
0.01 
***, **, * implies significance at 99, 95 and 90% levels respectively.  
Included in the regressions analyses but not recorded here are the constant and the 
explanatory variables of the gravity model as reported in table 2. 
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these results as he reports a smaller effect for a sub-sample of countries with 
per capita GDP above $1000. 
Our findings also conform to earlier empirical studies on related topics. 
Recently, Lederman et al. (2006) took up the issue of the effectiveness of 
export promotion in a group of 104 countries and the year 2005. The data set 
is based on a rich survey answered by 83 agencies, covering questions about 
their institutional structures, responsibilities, objectives and strategies, 
resources and expenditures, and activities and client orientation. Lederman et 
al. thus are able to give a good description of export promotion practices 
around the world. This study, however, is especially quoted for having found a 
correlation between per capita export promotion and per capita exports. The 
elasticity in Lederman et al. (2006) at the mean of the sample explains about 
8% of the median country’s export, which is more or less of the same order of 
magnitude as found in our study and in the empirical studies on the impact of 
embassies and consulates that we discussed in this article. However, and highly 
relevant from the perspective of the present article these results are driven by 
the developing countries suggesting substantial heterogeneity across levels of 
development. In particular it is important that for OECD countries the 
relationship in Lederman et al (2006) is insignificant like in our study; that is: 
the effect is zero.  
Our results therefore also offer indirect support for the emerging empirical 
literature on new and intangible barriers the trade such as a lack of thrust, 
cultural differences and ineffective governance (a lack of an enforceable legal 
framework, accountability and stability). We have discussed a number of 
potential market failures which hamper international exchange and in our 
opinion our empirical results imply that embassies and consulates succeed in 
solving or reducing some of these market failures, the more so because of the 
fact that export facilitation between developed and developing countries is 
significant whereas it is not within the separate group of higher income 
countries. In our opinion this reflects that markets in the developing countries 
tend to be more incomplete implying that market failures may be more of a 
problem in these countries then in the industrial countries. Therefore it is 
relevant for our discussion that Dekker et al. (2006), Den Butter and Mosch 
(2003) and Guiso et al. (2004) find that a one standard deviation increase in 
thrust increases bilateral trade on average by some 24 to 38%. In the same 
manner Dekker et al. (2004), Linders et al. (2005) and Lankhuizen et al. (2008) 
uncover that a one standard deviation reduction in ‘cultural distance’ increases 
the stock of FDI by 16 to 28%. Highly relevant is the assessment of this by De 
Groot et al. (2004, p. 119) that “good governance lowers the transaction costs 
for trade between high-income countries, while trade between low-income 
countries suffers from high insecurity and transaction costs.” Typically 
economic diplomacy can be useful in the context of such market and 
government failures. 
Indeed, our finding of significant and high estimates for embassies and 
consulates in the trade flows from higher income countries to lower income 
countries and vice versa is another corroboration of the fact that market 
failures do exist at least in international trade which justifies the existence of 
economic diplomacy in order to solve problems related to market failures. We 
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expect that this phenomenon will become more important over time. The 
emergence of new economies with very different institutions and cultural 
background will influence global norms and values and this will undoubtedly 
have an impact on the rules of international trade and investment. In particular 
the historical, cultural and institutional background of China and India may in 
the long run exert an influence on the ways the world defines and settles 
international conflicts.  Typically, the available analyses of low volumes of 
South–South trade are concerned with infrastructure and trade facilities. Our 
analysis adds a new element to that discussion, namely the need to establish 
good political relationship to breed thrust as an important facilitator of 
mutually beneficial trade. 
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APPENDIX  
Import Destinations of Rose. 
In Bold are his exporting countries. The highlighted countries are the 63 
exporting and importing countries in the present analysis 
Afghanistan  Albania  Algeria (LMIC) American Samoa 
Angola  Argentina (UMIC) Aruba  Australia (HIC) 
Azerbaijan  Antigua & Barbuda  Armenia  Austria (HIC) 
Bahamas  Bahrain  Bangladesh (LIC) Barbados 
Belize  Benin  Bhutan  Bosnia & Herz. 
Botswana  Brunei Darussalam  Bulgaria (UMIC) Burkina Faso 
Burundi  Belarus (LMIC) Belgium (HIC) Bermuda 
Bolivia  Brazil (UMIC) Cambodia  Cameroon 
Canada (HIC) Cape Verde  Central African Rep. Chad 
Chile (UMIC) China (LMIC) China, Hong Kong  China, Macao 
Comoros  Congo, Dem. Rep.  Costa Rica  Cote D’Ivoire 
Croatia  Cuba  Czech Rep. (HIC) Colombia 
Congo, Rep  Cyprus  Denmark (HIC) Djibouti 
Dominica  Dom. Rep. (LMIC) Ecuador (LMIC) Egypt (LMIC) 
El Salvador  Equatorial Guinea  Eritrea  Estonia 
Ethiopia  Faeroe Islands  Falkland Islands  Fiji 
Finland (HIC) France (HIC) French Polynesia  Gabon 
Gambia  Georgia  Germany (HIC) Gibraltar 
Greece (HIC) Greenland  Grenada  Guam 
Guinea-Bissau  Guyana  Ghana  Guatemala 
Guinea  Haiti  Honduras  Hungary (UMIC) 
Iceland  India (LIC) Indonesia (LMIC) Iran (LMIC) 
Iraq  Ireland (HIC) Italy (HIC) Israel (HIC) 
Japan (HIC) Jordan  Jamaica  Kazakhstan 
Kenya (LIC) Kiribati  Korea (HIC) Kuwait (HIC) 
Kyrgyz Rep.  Laos  Latvia  Lebanon 
Lesotho  Liberia  Libya  Luxembourg 
Lithuania  Macedonia  Madagascar  Malaysia (UMIC) 
Maldives  Malta  Mauritania  Moldova 
Morocco (LMIC) Myanmar  Malawi  Mali 
Mauritius  Mexico (UMIC) Mongolia  Mozambique 
Nepal  Netherlands (HIC) Netherlands Antilles New Caledonia 
Niger  Nigeria (LIC) North Korea  Norway (HIC) 
Namibia  Nauru  New Zealand (HIC) Nicaragua 
Oman  Pakistan (LIC) Palau  Panama 
Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru (LMIC) Philippines (LMIC) 
Poland (UMIC) Portugal (HIC) Qatar  Romania (UMIC) 
Russia (UMIC) Rwanda  Samoa  S. Tome & Principe 
Saudi Arabia (HIC) Senegal  Serbia  Montenegro  Seychelles 
Sierra Leone  Singapore (HIC) Slovakia  Solomon Islands 
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Appendix continued 
 
Somalia  South Africa (UMIC) Spain (HIC) Sri Lanka 
St. Helena  St. Kitts & Nevis  St. Pierre-Miquelon  Suriname 
Sweden (HIC) Switzerland (HIC) Slovenia  St. Lucia 
St. Vincent & Gren.  Sudan (LIC) Swaziland  Syria 
Tajikistan  Tanzania  Togo  Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia (LMIC) Turkmenistan  Tuvalu  Thailand (LMIC) 
Tonga  Turkey (UMIC) Uganda (LIC) Ukraine (LMIC) 
Un. Arab Emirates UK (HIC) USA (HIC) Uruguay (UMIC) 
Uzbekistan  Vanuatu  Vietnam (LIC) Venezuela (UMIC) 
Wallis-Futuna  Yemen  Zimbabwe  Zambia 
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